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Abstract
Job-Market signaling is ranked high among the explanations why in-
dividuals engage voluntarily in OSS projects. If true, signaling implies
the existence of a wage premium for OSS engagement. However, due
to a lack of data this issue has not been tested previously. Based on a
novel data set comprising detailed demographic and wage information
for some 7,000 German IT employees, this paper ﬁlls this gap. In the
empirical analysis, however, we ﬁnd no support for the signaling hypoth-
esis, a result that is robust to di erent measures of OSS involvement
and di erent model speciﬁcations.
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11 Introduction
During the past years, the emergence of Open Source Software (OSS) and
the associated development model have been the subject of extensive research
in economics (cf. Rossi 2006 for a review). Although one might consider
the study of the OSS phenomenon interesting in its own right, it is primarily
the uncomfortable questions that the presence of OSS poses to mainstream
economics that have attracted the attention of researchers. A central issue here
is the question of what drives OSS programmers to donate valuable software
code free of charge, and the important implications of this beyond the narrow
ﬁeld of OSS (see e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2002, Johnson 2002, Myatt and Wallace
2002, Bessen 2006, Bitzer et al. 2007).
A cursory overview of the OSS literature reveals that although voluntary
OSS programmers donate software free of charge, they are by no means unre-
warded. The rewards depend on the particular motives involved. Individuals
may be user-programmers, they may be driven by the urge to donate a gift
to the community, they may simply enjoy programming, or they may beneﬁt
from the learning associated with programming OSS (see Rossi, 2006, for a
recent survey). Perhaps the most elegant explanation is the signaling hypoth-
esis advocated by Lerner and Tirole (2002). They argue that programmers
engage in voluntary OSS programming in order to disclose their unobservable
ability to employers: a situation of classic Spence-type (1973, 1974) job-market
signaling.
Viewed from this perspective, the presence of OSS is a unique natural
2experiment that allows us to investigate di erent motivational drivers that
may be at work in an economy. Accordingly, the investigation of di erent
motives and reward channels within OSS has been an area of lively empirical
research (see, e.g., Hars and Ou 2002, Hertel et al. 2003, Krishnamurthy 2002,
Lakhani and Wolf 2005, and Wu et al. 2007).
The lack of comprehensive data to date has prevented adequate empiri-
cal investigation of the wage premium predicted by the job-market signaling
hypothesis. The data available to earlier studies covers only OSS and free soft-
ware contributors; thus information on the counterfactual, i.e., wages of pro-
grammers who do not contribute to OSS, is missing; see, e.g., Orman (2008).
Accordingly, previous data is ill-suited to estimate the wage premium for vol-
untarily OSS engagement. Moreover, even if data is available, an observed
wage premium would be driven by both a potential signaling e ect and a po-
tential direct e ect from the signal-carrying activity – say, learning e ects from
voluntary OSS programming that increase an individual’s human capital. Ac-
cordingly, simple estimates of a wage premium from OSS activity would risk
overstating the role of signaling.1
The present paper closes both of these gaps. First, we use a novel data set
containing information on OSS contributors and non-contributors alike. To
obtain the necessary information we augmented a longstanding general wage
survey among German IT sta  in the years 2006 and 2007 with a subset of
questions concerning OSS activities. In addition, the survey features rich detail
1In the literature on the returns to education the related issue of signaling versus human
capital e ects of education has received a great deal of attention, see the survey of Weiss
(1995) or Chevalier et al. (2004) for a recent empirical investigation based on UK data.
3on individual characteristics such as job functions, educational background,
etc. Out of the total of 7,115 programmers surveyed, 1,226 are active in OSS
activity.
Of these active OSS contributors, approximately 60% think that their vol-
untary engagement beneﬁts their career. Thus, their motive statement sug-
gests signaling, and is in line with results of the aforementioned motivation
studies based on active OSS contributors alone. Yet, whether the envisaged
beneﬁt actually materializes as a wage premium on the paycheck is an entirely
di erent question.
Second, within our dataset we are able to construct various measures of the
extent and nature of an individual’s OSS involvement. We estimate variants
of a Mincer wage equation to identify OSS wage premiums and to quantify the
extent to which these can be explained by signaling. The signaling hypothesis
assumes that the productivity of individuals is unobservable, and furthermore,
that only productive individuals would invest in sending the signal. From an
econometric point of view, the signal-carrying variable must thus be correlated
with the error term. Hence, if signaling is indeed taking place, the coe cient
of the potentially signal-carrying variable must su er from endogeneity bias.
By using instruments, we are able to quantify this bias and can therefore dis-
tinguish between direct e ects (say learning) and signaling e ects of voluntary
OSS engagement on wages.
To summarize our main results, we ﬁnd no evidence of a positive wage
premium for OSS engagement. Thus neither the signaling hypothesis, nor the
4claim of learning e ects is supported by the data. These results are robust to
all our OSS indicator variables and di erent model speciﬁcations.
The next section provides a brief background for our empirical investiga-
tion. Section 3 presents the data and econometric method. Section 4 presents
the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Organization of Thought
To guide our empirical investigation, we brieﬂy illustrate some central mecha-
nisms of signaling situations. The basic setup features workers with private
unveriﬁable information about their individual productivity, which is heteroge-
neous across agents. On the labor market, ﬁrms make wage o ers with the aim
of hiring the most productive workers. An observable activity – say obtaining a
university degree, the cost of which depends on the student’s productivity – can
then serve as a signal separating higher-productivity from lower-productivity
individuals. However, depending on the cost and proﬁt structures, heterogene-
ity distribution, and assumptions about the market structures, the system may
equally well result in a pooling equilibrium, where no separation occurs.
We can mold these general principles into a simple stylized description of
the software programming industry, in line with the arguments of Lerner and
Tirole (2002). In doing so, it is instructive to account for key features of
OSS contributions: the possibility of several simultaneously observable signal-
bearing activities (e.g., education and OSS provision), private and unobserv-
able pay-o s from such activities (e.g., user-programmer beneﬁts, fun), and
5veriﬁcation costs, where ﬁrms may have to expend e ort in evaluating a signal
(e.g., the cost of judging an individual’s programming abilities based on his or
her OSS code).
Avoiding unnecessary structure, these ideas can be consolidated into the
following simple setup.2 A population of software programmers features n
individuals, i, that are each identiﬁed by a unique programming cost ci   0,
i.e., reﬂecting his or her programming skills/productivity. These individuals
may engage in various signal-carrying activities, j, such as obtaining university
degrees or programming OSS. While in general the cost of displaying various
signals will depend on and increase with an agent’s programming costs, ci,
additional private beneﬁts, bi, may, however, enter and distort signals. If there
exist user-programmer beneﬁts, play values (homo ludens payo , Bitzer et
al. 2007), or gift beneﬁts, then the private value of the veriﬁable activity j,
net of any potential wage premium for individual i becomes Sij(c,b). The
various payo s are private knowledge, while the underlying distributions and
dependencies are common knowledge. For our purposes, it is not necessary to
make any assumptions about these underlying distributions or dependencies,
e.g., c and b may or may not be correlated.
A simple labor market is given by competitive hiring from a number of
identical software ﬁrms, each of which is assumed to employ m < n computer
programmers. Although individual programmers’ cost and beneﬁt realizations
are private knowledge, employers (ﬁrms) know the distributions, and at a cost
2The setup presented here largely reﬂects the consensus ideas concerning signaling laid
out by Michael Spence in his Nobel Prize Lecture, Spence (2002).
6dj can verify whether an individual displays a certain signal.3 The production
process is such that a ﬁrms revenue, R, depends, inter alia, on the average
programming ability of its employees. Representing the sum of m individual
programming costs by  , we can postulate  R
   < 0. Thus hiring the average
individual at wage w would imply   = 1
m
 m
i=1 ci =¯ c and proﬁts   = R( )  
mw. Finally, zero proﬁts in equilibrium and the participation constraint of
individuals complete the setup.
Within the above structure, a number of observations can be stated. First,
in any pooling equilibrium, where ﬁrms pay the pooling wage wP we have:
Result 1. In a pooling equilibrium, the pooling wage is wP = 1
mR(¯ c), and
individuals will display a given signal if Sij(c,b) > 0, i.e., if their private
beneﬁts (e.g., play value) exceed their respective signal-displaying costs.
Secondly, separation may occur along a given signal. In such a situation,
it is the case that:
Result 2. In a separating equilibrium, where k < n individuals display a




i=1 ci  dl), while the low-wage




i=k ci), and individuals will display signal l if
Sil(c,b) >w L   wH, i.e., the wage premium plus private beneﬁts exceed the
respective signal-displaying costs. At the same time, all other signals j will be
displayed if Sij(c,b) > 0;j  = l.
3The cost dj would, in the case of OSS, for example, capture the e ort required to actually
obtain and evaluate a programmer’s OSS code. In the case of a university degree, however,
dj may be zero.
7Of course, we cannot determine here whether equilibria exist, whether sepa-
ration or pooling takes place, which signal-bearing activities are observed, what
size k is, or which signals are working, resulting in separation. Answers to these
questions require more structure and will in general depend on the functions,
R, S, the distribution of programming costs, ci and private beneﬁts, bi, the size
of the veriﬁcation costs, dj, and the various dependencies or independencies
of these functions and distributions (see Spence 2002). However, the general
results from above provide us with a series of implications, several of which
can be applied to the data for empirical investigation.
Implication 1. In a separating equilibrium, operating signals will be associated
with a wage premium.
Implication 1 contains the classic signaling hypothesis as evoked by Lerner
and Tirole (2002) and leads to the straightforward empirical prediction at the
center of our analysis.
In one respect, however, OSS signaling in the programmer labor market
di ers from classic job-market signaling. In contrast to an educational signal,
which may last a lifetime, the OSS contribution is a recorded observation of
programming skills for a given technology and programming challenge. Thus,
in view of the rapid developments in the software industry, with short knowl-
edge life-cycles, it is unlikely for old OSS signals to command a present-day
wage premium. Accordingly, we expect to ﬁnd the strongest wage premium
e ect for contemporaneous OSS contributions.
Implication 2. With noise from private payo s, bi, signal-bearing activities
8may be observed but may not work. Thus signals may also appear in a pooling
equilibrium. This is because, with unobserved private payo s that may be very
high, even individuals with low productivity can display the signal.
Thus, by Implication 1 and 2, the observation of a potentially signal-bearing
activity itself does not guarantee a situation in which the signal works. On the
contrary, not only may these private beneﬁts render a separation unstable, the
observed signal-bearing – but malfunctioning – activity may only be explained
by referring to the private beneﬁts.
Moreover, in a situation depicted in Implication 2, the observed signal-
bearing activity will not be associated with a wage premium. However, al-
though this is generally the case for a pooling situation, separating equilibria
may feature malfunctioning signals alongside the functional signal:
Implication 3. In a separating equilibrium with the properly working signal l,
an additional signal-bearing activity j may be observed. If Sij(c,b) and Sil(c,b)
are positively correlated, both activities may be associated with a wage premium.
The above implications already sum up to an empirically relevant scenario
where multiple signals may be observed and can be measured and compared to
individual earnings. It also immediately becomes clear that this investigation
strategy requires observation of individuals who do and individuals who do not
display the particular signals. Any analysis based on observations of only those
who do display a given signal will fail to test for the above mechanisms. Fur-
thermore, the above illustrates that private beneﬁts may in principle blur the
situation substantially, rendering only some of all possible signals functional,
9or pushing the system into the pooling equilibrium. Finally, the wage premium
may be inverted: for example, with dependent b and c distributions, positive
mapping would disclose those displaying a signal driven by b as unproductive
(high c).
In line with the e ects from private beneﬁts b, the role of direct e ects
from a signaling activity – such as learning e ects – can be considered. It is a
common simpliﬁcation in models of signaling and screening that the observable
activity has no e ect on the underlying unobservable characteristics of individ-
uals; e.g., it is assumed that education has no e ect on the human capital and
hence productivity of an individual. Obviously, these simpliﬁcations, though
useful from a modeling perspective, do not hold when taking the theory to the
data. This is particularly important in the extensive literature on returns to
education, where signaling e ects and direct human capital e ects of education
need to be disentangled in order to assess the true value of education; see, e.g.
Weiss (1995) or Chevalier et al.(2004). The same issue occurs in the context of
voluntary OSS involvement: where individuals beneﬁt from their OSS activity
in terms of training and learning (see the studies of Hars and Ou 2002, or Wu
et al. 2007), this corresponds to a reduction in ci as a result of OSS activity.
Following the extension of signaling with direct productivity (human capital)
e ects provided in Spence (2002), we can state:
Implication 4. In the presence of direct e ects from the signal-carrying ac-
tivity (learning e ects), pooling equilibria may dominate some but not all pre-
viously viable separating equilibria, and investment into the signal-carrying
10activity may be observed even though no separation occurs.
Next, we brieﬂy illustrate further implications that are less suitable for
empirical investigation.
Implication 5. Ceteris paribus, more individuals will display a working signal,
j, in a separating equilibrium, compared to the number of individuals displaying
j in a pooling equilibrium.
Implication 6. An increase in the veriﬁcation cost dj makes activity j less
likely to be a proper working signal.
Veriﬁcation costs will di er by the nature of the signal in question. While
verifying university degrees is relatively cheap, assessing an applicant’s pro-
grammed code might be relatively more cumbersome.
And ﬁnally, combining Implications 2 and 6:
Implication 7. There exists a trade-o  between veriﬁcation costs, dj, and
noise from Si,j, such that a signal associated with more noise may still work if
it features lower veriﬁcation costs.
Finally, and outside the scope of the above simple framework, our empirical
investigation may – and most likely is – confronted with out-of-equilibrium
situations. For example, in disequilibrium, individuals may expend e ort on
signal-bearing activities with a view to higher wages, although no actual wage
premium ultimately materializes. Whether or not such situations qualify as
signaling cannot easily be resolved.
113 Data and Estimation Technique
Our data were collected in collaboration with the German computer magazine
“C’t Magazin f¨ ur Computer Technik”, by expanding their annual Internet-
based IT wage survey for the years 2006 and 2007 to include a subsection of
questions on whether the respondent contributes to OSS projects in his or her
spare time. Our data are unique compared to data used in earlier empirical
studies (e.g., Hars and Ou 2002, Hertel et al. 2003, Krishnamurthy 2002,
Lakhani and Wolf 2005, and Wu et al. 2007) in that we assemble information
on annual wages and numerous demographic and workplace-related character-
istics both for individuals who do contribute as well as for those who do not
contribute to OSS projects.
We restrict our sample to prime-age (18-65) men and women in full-time
employment. In addition to gross annual wages, we measure all additional
labor income such as premiums and bonus pay. To reduce the noisiness of the
data, we recode a number of wage observations that appear to correspond to
monthly instead of yearly labor income, and exclude remaining observations
with implausibly low gross wages (below 1,000 euros).4 To insure comparability
across years, labor income for 2006 and 2007 is transformed into constant prices
applying the national consumer price index. Annual labor income is then
transformed into monthly labor income utilizing information on the number
of work months per individual.
Pooled over the years 2006 and 2007, our sample contains a cross-section
4We also estimate all speciﬁcations with the pure unaltered data. Our key ﬁndings do
not change.
12of 7,115 individuals. Out of our sample, 1,226 individuals engage in volun-
tary OSS contributions, of whom 259 declare a role as a project leader. Most
intriguing – and in line with the results of motive studies conducted among
OSS contributors alone (Hars and Ou 2002, Hertel et al. 2003, Krishnamurthy
2002, Lakhani and Wolf 2005, and Wu et al. 2007) – 753 of the active OSS
programmers in our sample state that they think their voluntary OSS activi-
ties beneﬁt their career. Descriptive statistics by OSS contributor status are
reported in Table 1.
To identify a potential OSS wage premium, we estimate variants of the
following Mincer wage equation (see Mincer 1974):
lnWi =   +  OSSi +  DEMOGi +  WORKi +  i (1)
where OSS denotes OSS contributor status measured in various ways,
DEMOG a set of demographic controls such as age, gender, educational at-
tainment, and work experience, and WORK a number of workplace-related
characteristics such as industry, occupational ﬁeld, and ﬁrm size. We assume
orthogonality of the error term   with respect to our control variables except
OSS. To accommodate heteroscedasticity, standard errors are bootstrapped.
According to Implication 1 in Section 2, OSS contributions should generate
a positive wage premium if they work as a signal and if a separating equilibrium
is feasible.
13In the empirical application one has to be cautious, however, when inter-
preting the outcome of a simple regression model.
First of all, we have an identiﬁcation problem similar to the one prevalent
in the returns to schooling literature as surveyed in Weiss (1995). There is the
theoretical possibility that OSS contributions have a direct positive or negative
wage e ect that may not be due to signaling, i.e., that may not be due to a
selection of unobservable more productive workers into OSS activities. One
possibility for a direct positive wage e ect of OSS engagement arises through
learning. Thus, individuals may become more productive through their OSS
activity, yielding a wage premium. However, this e ect has to be distinguished
from a signaling e ect, which refers to a selection of already more productive
individuals into OSS activities; see Implication 4.
Accordingly, if OSS contributions indeed work as a signal for unobserved
productivity, then by deﬁnition the residual must be correlated with the OSS
indicator variable, i.e., OSS must be endogenous.5
However, endogeneity does not necessarily stem from unobserved hetero-
geneity. It can also arise from simultaneity between wages and OSS contri-
butions. Thus, even if OSS contributions are found to be correlated with the
error term, this is not su cient to establish the relevance of signalling.
Our empirical strategy is therefore twofold. In a ﬁrst step we estimate
a simple OLS model deriving a composite OSS coe cient that consists of
the direct wage e ect of OSS contributions as well as an endogeneity bias
5Only if the OSS indicator variable is perfectly collinear with unobserved heterogeneity,
this correlation should be zero. This is, however, unlikely as OSS is a binary variable and
unobserved productivity arguably is continuous.
14component due to unobserved heterogeneity or simultaneity. Subsequently,
in a second step we instrument for OSS and quantify the endogeneity bias
component.
To test the robustness of our results with respect to distorted income mea-
sures, we estimate two alternative models. First, we apply some top- and
bottom-coding at the ﬁrst and 99th percentile to monthly labor income. Sec-
ond, we employ median regression, which is considerably more robust to outly-
ing observations than the ordinary least squares estimator. Our main ﬁndings
are reported in the following section.
4 Results and Discussion
Table 2 presents the results from the ﬁrst step of our main empirical speciﬁca-
tion, in which the indicator variable OSS captures all individuals who report
contributing to OSS projects during their spare time, irrespective of how much
e ort they actually invest.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results of a simple OLS model, while
Columns 2 and 3 show the results of outlier-robust top/bottom-coding and
absolute di erence model estimations.
Overall, the models have a very good ﬁt and the coe cients are generally
in line with what one would expect from standard wage regressions in the
literature (see, e.g., Brown and Medo  1989, Schmidt and Zimmerman 1991).
Furthermore, the coe cients of the simple OLS and the two outlier-robust
regressions are fairly similar. When focusing on the simple OLS model (Ta-
15ble 2, Column 1), our demographic and human-capital-related control variables
age, tenure, and IT work experience a ect wages in a non-linear way, with a
peak at about 45 and at 19 and 23 years, respectively. Our results further in-
dicate that in our sample, males, ceteris paribus, earn approximately 7 percent
more than females.6 In addition, we ﬁnd a considerable correlation between
education and wages. Respondents with a university, polytechnical, or ad-
vanced vocational degree earn about 21, 14, and 4 percent more, respectively,
than respondents without any formal degree. Interestingly, respondents with
a basic vocational degree are found to earn about 5 percent less, while indi-
viduals who have at least some university experience but no formal degree are
found to earn 4 percent more than respondents with no degree at all. We also
ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant positive wage e ects of around 7 percent for those
living in an urban area.
Furthermore, with respect to workplace-related control variables, we ﬁnd
that respondents with supervisory responsibilities ceteris paribus earn about 9
percent more, while respondents who work partly abroad have a wage premium
of about 9 percent. At the same time, wages consistently increase with ﬁrm
size. Respondents in small, medium, and large ﬁrms, ceteris paribus, earn 10,
18, and 28 percent more than respondents in very small ﬁrms with up to 10
employees.
Regarding the OSS coe cient that is of highest interest in the context of
the present study, none of the model speciﬁcations in Table 2 are suggestive
6(exp(0.0633)   1)   100 = 6.5
16of any positive wage premium for voluntary OSS contributions. All OSS
coe cients are very small, never exceed their respective standard errors, and
in the two outlier robust estimations, even take on a negative sign.
In a second step, we now instrument for the OSS indicator variable to assess
the scope of the endogeneity bias. What is required is a set of variables that
has su cient explanatory power for OSS contributions while being orthogonal
to the error term in the wage regression.
Our data contains two variables that constitute ideal candidates for this
task. Respondents give information on whether they are knowledgable in the
Linux and/or Macintosh operating system. Arguably, Linux and Macintosh
users share a certain opposition against the market leader, the MS Windows
operating system, and also today perhaps moreso in the case of Linux rely
more heavily on user community support. Such preferences and attitudes
may be associated with a higher propensity to contribute to OSS projects on
various platforms that challenge commercial software products. As the large
F-Statistic for our excluded instruments (linux and mac) reported in Table 3
indicates, we indeed ﬁnd strong support for this view. Knowledge of the Linux
and/or Macintosh operating system is found to be a very strong predictor for
voluntary OSS contributions. Furthermore, as the Hansen-J statistic in Ta-
ble 3 shows, we cannot reject orthogonality of our excluded instruments within
reasonable conﬁdence bounds. Thus, the excluded instrumental variables are
valid and we can carry out a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to test for systematic
di erences between a consistent GMM model and a potentially inconsistent
17but e cient OLS model, i.e., to quantify the endogeneity bias component in
the coe cients estimated in Table 2.7
As the test statistic in Table 3 indicates, however, we cannot reject the H0
that di erences in the parameters between the two models are not systematic.
Accordingly, our OSS indicator variable can indeed be considered exogenous,
i.e., the aforementioned endogeneity bias component is in fact zero. Thus,
there is no evidence either for simultaneity or for unobserved heterogeneity
bias. Summarizing, we ﬁnd the direct wage premium of OSS contributions
to be zero, and have no evidence supporting the idea that voluntary OSS
contributions work as a signal for unobserved productivity.
However, according to Implication 3 in Section 2, several signals can be
correlated and thereby associated with a positive wage premium. In our em-
pirical analysis, this raises the issue of multicolinearity between the potential
signals OSS and educational attainment. However, as reported in Table 1, it
is obvious that there is no strong correlation between educational attainment
and OSS contributions. Nevertheless, we re-estimate our baseline speciﬁca-
tions without controlling for educational attainment to identify any potential
collinearity issues. As is apparent in Columns 4-6 of Table 2, the coe cients
on the OSS indicator variable remain very small and again never exceed their
standard errors, while exogeneity cannot be rejected within reasonable conﬁ-
dence bounds (see Table 3). Thus, there is no evidence for multicollinearity
between educational attainment and OSS contributions, and Implication 3 in
7All GMM regressions and associated tests are carried out using Stata’s ivreg2 module.
Baum et al. (2003) give a detailed description of the computations and instrument validity
tests.
18Section 2 is not relevant.
We further search for evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis by dif-
ferentiating between di erent OSS indicators. First of all, we condition the
OSS indicator to take the value one only if respondents actually invest at least
three (OSS3) or ten (OSS10) hours per week, respectively. Second, we gener-
ate an indicator variable exclusively for OSS project leaders (OSSPL). Third,
we estimate a model with actual hours per week invested in OSS projects as
a regressor (OSS   Hours, OSS   Hours2). Table 4 shows the composite
coe cient estimates from this exercise, reﬂecting the direct e ect o  OSS en-
gagement as well as any potential endogeneity bias. Again, all OSS-related
coe cients are very small, never exceed their respective standard errors, and
even take on a negative sign. When testing for endogeneity bias, we again
cannot reject the exogeneity assumption; hence, unobserved productivity is
not correlated with OSS involvement.8
Thus, if voluntary OSS contributions indeed yield wage premiums, their rel-
evance must be heterogeneous across the sample. To test for this, we estimate
several speciﬁcations interacting our OSS indicator variables with education,
age, and ﬁrm size. To save space, we only report results for our basic OSS
indicator variable and for OSS project leaders in Table 5. However, none of the
interacted estimations generated a positive, statistically signiﬁcant coe cient
on the OSS indicator variables.
As a ﬁnal exercise, we considerably reduced sample heterogeneity by fo-
8We do not attempt to instrument the continuous variables OSS Hours, OSS Hours2
with our binary instrumental variables.
19cusing on the subgroup of software developers as opposed to the remaining IT
personnel in employment ﬁelds such as network administration, consulting, and
web design, yielding a reduced sample size of 2,548 observations. Arguably, the
signaling e ect of OSS contributions should be strongest among professional
software developers. Table 6 shows the respective coe cient estimates for our
basic OSS indicator.
Although we ﬁnd no evidence for a signiﬁcant general OSS wage premium
(see Column 1, Table 6), when interacting the OSS indicator with educational
attainment we ﬁnd a sizable positive statistically signiﬁcant wage premium
of OSS contributions for respondents with no formal degree. Accordingly,
in the subsample of software developers, voluntary OSS contributions raise
wages for unskilled workers by 16 percent. Furthermore, as the test statistics
reported at the bottom of Table 6 show, we cannot reject the H0 of exogene-
ity of OSS within reasonable conﬁdence bounds. Accordingly, the estimated
OSS wage premium for unskilled workers can be fully accounted for by di-
rect productivity-increasing e ects (i.e., learning) and is not attributable to
signaling.
Thus, our results lend some support to the idea that voluntary OSS en-
gagement can make software developers without any formal degree more pro-
ductive. It is, however, important to bear in mind that these ﬁndings only
apply to a small subgroup of our sample: in total, our data only contain 17
unskilled OSS contributors.
Summarizing our results, we do not ﬁnd any evidence for a selection of
20unobservably more productive workers into OSS activity in any speciﬁcation.
Hence, our empirical analysis does not lend any support to the signaling hy-
pothesis outlined in Implication 1 in Section 2. The situation we observe is
rather that described in Implication 2 of Section 2. Accordingly, voluntary OSS
engagement is merely the result of higher private beneﬁts, b, of contributors,
and thus cannot carry a signal of higher productivity.
Even if there is some positive selection of higher productivity types into
OSS contributions, the noise introduced by the aforementioned private bene-
ﬁts, b, requires ﬁrms to monitor the quality of OSS contributions. Thus, our
results are also consistent with a situation in which positive selection in princi-
ple takes place, but in which monitoring costs, d, are too high, rendering OSS
contributions unusable for signaling purposes.
In our theoretical reasoning, we did not make any assumptions about the
distribution of unobserved productivity. If, conditional on all demographic
and educational observables, unobserved productivity is su ciently evenly dis-
tributed, then even with low monitoring costs, d, there would be no need for
ﬁrms to use OSS contributions as an additional signal.
Finally, in our theoretical reasoning, we considered di erent equilibria. If,
however, we are in a situation out of equilibrium, then a separating equilibrium
(Result 2 in Section 2) with an associated positive wage premium for contem-
poraneous voluntary OSS contributions may still materialize in the future.
215 Conclusion
The economics literature argues that job-market signaling can explain why
individuals acquire costly signals. This fundamental rationale is believed to
apply to the case of volunteer contributors to OSS. The present paper has
investigated this prospect with a novel data set based on a survey of some 7,000
German IT employees. The present approach di ers from previous studies
insofar as our data comprises demographics and wage information both for
individuals who do and for those who do not contribute to OSS.
Our approach enables us to test for a wage premium associated with sig-
naling and to di erentiate it from direct wage e ects, e.g., via learning. Con-
cerning the signaling hypothesis, we do not ﬁnd any evidence for a selection of
unobservably more productive workers into OSS activities in any of our mul-
tiple speciﬁcations. Hence, our empirical analysis does not lend any support
to the signaling hypothesis.
This highlights the importance of private payo s such as play value or
monitoring costs associated with OSS, which render a separating equilibrium
in which voluntary OSS contributions signal higher productivity unfeasible.
Accordingly, the implications of our results go beyond the narrow study of
OSS, and relate to fundamental issues of work incentives.
22Tables




Mean Std-Deviation Mean Std-Deviation H0: Means identical
4284.31 (2273.58) 4422.04 (7564.49)
Age (in years) 33.38 (6.78) 32.19 (6.32) ***
Tenure (in years) 6.30 (4.70) 6.42 (4.86)
IT-Work Experience (in years) 8.52 (5.84) 8.23 (5.55)
Gender 0.98 (0.14) 1.00 (0.05) ***
EDU: University 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43)
EDU: Polytechnical 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41)
EDU: Advanced Vocational 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31)
EDU: Vocational 0.25 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
EDU: Uni without Degree 0.09 (0.29) 0.13 (0.33) ***
EDU: No Degree 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23)
Supervisor 0.27 (0.44) 0.33 (0.47) ***
Urban Area 0.58 (0.49) 0.57 (0.49)
Firm Size: 1   10 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30) ***
Firm Size: 11   100 0.28 (0.45) 0.33 (0.47) ***
Firm Size: 100   1000 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
Firm Size: > 1000 0.37 (0.48) 0.31 (0.46) ***
Foreign Work Experience 0.17 (0.38) 0.21 (0.41) ***
Observations 5889 1226
Remarks: Dependent variable is log W. *,**,*** indicate H0 of Mean Comparison Test rejected with 10%, 5%, 1%
error probability
23Table 2: Basic Regression
Simple OLS OLS with Median Regression Simple OLS OLS with Median Regression
Top/Bottom Coding Model Top/Bottom Coding Model
OSS -0.0011 -0.0055 -0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0046 -0.0019
[0.0097] [0.0078] [0.0104] [0.0092] [0.0078] [0.0086]
Age 0.0453 0.0437 0.0420 0.0701 0.0686 0.0705
[0.0073]*** [0.0057]*** [0.0061]*** [0.0074]*** [0.0053]*** [0.0060]***
Age2 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
Tenure 0.0113 0.0114 0.0107 0.0077 0.0077 0.0030
[0.0031]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0030]** [0.0026]*** [0.0035]
Tenure2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
[0.0001]** [0.0001]** [0.0002]*** [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002]
IT Work Experience 0.033 0.0324 0.0295 0.0239 0.0234 0.0222
[0.0029]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0037]***
IT Work Experience2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
Gender 0.0633 0.0641 0.0603 0.0695 0.0704 0.0723
[0.0230]*** [0.0222]*** [0.0285]*** [0.0255]*** [0.0236]*** [0.0222]***
EDU:University 0.1891 0.1837 0.1945
[0.0185]*** [0.0148]*** [0.0172]***
EDU:Polytechnical 0.1298 0.1275 0.1450
[0.0187]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0155]***
EDU:Advanced Vocational 0.0411 0.0366 0.0642
[0.0223]* [0.0177]** [0.0187]***
EDU:Vocational -0.0474 -0.0516 -0.0328
[0.0181]*** [0.0143]*** [0.0159]***
EDU:Uni No Degree 0.0394 0.0383 0.0561
[0.0206]* [0.0173]** [0.0182]***
Supervisor 0.0891 0.0867 0.0786 0.095 0.0926 0.0894
[0.0075]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0079]*** [0.0079]*** [0.0089]***
Urban Area 0.0633 0.0631 0.0642 0.0685 0.0682 0.0722
[0.0094]*** [0.0071]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0079]***
Firm Size:> 1000 0.2451 0.2418 0.2339 0.2645 0.261 0.2543
[0.0168]*** [0.0162]*** [0.0158]*** [0.0171]*** [0.0174]*** [0.0201]***
Firm Size:100   1000 0.162 0.1602 0.1466 0.1708 0.1689 0.1570
[0.0198]*** [0.0147]*** [0.0175]*** [0.0202]*** [0.0158]*** [0.0197]***
Firm Size:11   100 0.0918 0.0923 0.0853 0.1034 0.1039 0.0958
[0.0171]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0151]*** [0.0180]*** [0.0165]*** [0.0187]***
Foreign Work Experience 0.0842 0.084 0.0786 0.0942 0.094 0.0856
[0.0085]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0085]*** [0.0077]*** [0.0090]*** [0.0084]***
Year 2007 -0.0298 -0.0274 -0.0155 -0.0315 -0.0291 -0.0209
[0.0066]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0081]***
Constant 6.4807 6.5154 6.5178 6.1186 6.1467 6.1398
[0.1293]*** [0.1125]*** [0.1323]*** [0.1306]*** [0.0996]*** [0.1160]***
Observations 7115 7115 7115 7115 7115 7115
adj. R2 0.52 0.56 0.38 0.49 0.52 0.35
Employment Field Dummies Chi2 540.14 589.89 331.50 980.69 973.96 543.47
Federal State Dummies Chi2 428.16 990.95 530.20 402.68 845.06 620.76
Industry Dummies Chi2 343.70 177.88 234.48 358.15 166.14 244.81
Remarks: Dependent variable is log W. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% error
probability. Default categories: EDU: No Degree; Firm Size:1   10
Table 3: Exogeneity Test for OSS
Excluded Instruments: Knowledge in Linux OS, Mac OS
With Edcucational Controls Without Edcucational Controls
Predictive power F(2, 7053) = 135.72 F(2, 7058) = 137.07
for OSS (“ﬁrst stage”) p =0 .00 p =0 .00
Kleibergen-Paap Chi2 = 260.263 Chi2 = 262.611
Underidentiﬁkation LM Test p =0 .000 p =0 .000
Hansen J statistic Chi2 =0 .841 Chi2 =0 .788
for orthogonality of instruments p =0 .359 p =0 .375
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2 =0 .001 Chi2 =1 .016
Exogeneity Test p =0 .977 p =0 .313
Remarks: Based on GMM model to accomodate heteroskedasticity.











Age 0.0436 0.0436 0.0437 0.0438
[0.0065]*** [0.0057]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0051]***
Age2 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
Tenure 0.0114 0.0114 0.0114 0.0113
[0.0028]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0032]***
Tenure2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]** [0.0001]** [0.0001]**
IT Work Experience 0.0324 0.0324 0.0324 0.0325
[0.0027]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0033]***
IT Work Experience2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
Gender 0.0641 0.0636 0.0636 0.0646
[0.0230]*** [0.0221]*** [0.0216]*** [0.0220]***
EDU: University 0.1836 0.1835 0.1837 0.1837
[0.0180]*** [0.0148]*** [0.0150]*** [0.0168]***
EDU: Polytechnical 0.1274 0.1273 0.1275 0.1277
[0.0183]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0143]*** [0.0161]***
EDU: Advanced Vocational 0.0367 0.0364 0.0365 0.037
[0.0207]* [0.0178]** [0.0175]** [0.0213]*
EDU: Vocational -0.0515 -0.0517 -0.0516 -0.0517
[0.0174]*** [0.0144]*** [0.0134]*** [0.0175]***
EDU: Uni No Degree 0.0384 0.0381 0.0381 0.0383
[0.0198]* [0.0173]** [0.0161]** [0.0196]*
Supervisor 0.0867 0.0866 0.0865 0.0868
[0.0072]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0072]***
Urban Area 0.0632 0.0632 0.0632 0.0631
[0.0083]*** [0.0071]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0070]***
Firm Size: > 1000 0.2417 0.2418 0.2418 0.2418
[0.0159]*** [0.0163]*** [0.0152]*** [0.0137]***
Firm Size: 100   1000 0.16 0.1601 0.1601 0.1605
[0.0183]*** [0.0148]*** [0.0151]*** [0.0137]***
Firm Size: 11   100 0.0922 0.0921 0.0922 0.0924
[0.0160]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0144]*** [0.0144]***
Foreign Work Experience 0.0841 0.0838 0.0838 0.0839
[0.0079]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0079]*** [0.0080]***
Year 2007 -0.0275 -0.0274 -0.0273 -0.0275
[0.0060]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0067]*** [0.0073]***
Constant 6.5167 6.5155 6.5143 6.5138
[0.1162]*** [0.1120]*** [0.1221]*** [0.1002]***
Observations 7115 7115 7115 7115
adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
Employment Field Dummies Chi2 599.90 590.35 276.84 763.51
Federal State Dummies Chi2 504.91 993.40 796.61 568.78
Industry Dummies Chi2 346.50 176.83 329.76 249.26
Exogeneity Tests of OSS3 OSS10 OSS-PL
Excluded Instruments: Knowledge in Linux OS, Knowledge in Mac OS
Predictive Power F(2, 7053) = 96.85 F(2, 7053) = 32.84 F(2, 7053) = 27.88
(“ﬁrst stage”) p =0 .00 p =0 .00 p =0 .00
Kleibergen-Paap Chi2 = 188.00 Chi2 = 65.47 Chi2 = 55.49
Underidentiﬁkation LM Test p =0 .00 p =0 .000 p =0 .000
Hansen -J Statistic Chi2 =0 .836 Chi2 =0 .825 Chi2 =0 .794
for Orthogonality p =0 .3604 p =0 .3636 p =0 .3730
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2 =0 .002 Chi2 =0 .005 Chi2 =0 .030
Exogeneity Test p =0 .969 p =0 .942 p =0 .862
Remarks: Dependent variable is log W. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% error
probability. Default categories: EDU: No Degree; Firm Size:1   10
25Table 5: Interactions
Basic OSS OSS Project Leader
OSS -0.1149 0.1375
[0.2727] [0.6256]
OSS   Age 0.011 0.001
[0.0164] [0.0394]
OSS   Age2 -0.0002 -0.0002
[0.0002] [0.0006]
OSS   EDU : University -0.0017 0.0102
[0.0162] [0.0298]
OSS   EDU : Polytechnical -0.0134 -0.0489
[0.0211] [0.0428]
OSS   EDU : AdvancedV ocational -0.029 -0.0649
[0.0270] [0.0606]
OSS   EDU : V ocational 0.0001 -0.0084
[0.0148] [0.0495]
OSS   EDU : UniwithoutDegree 0.0548 0.1348
[0.0353] [0.1244]
OSS   EDU : Non -0.0188 0.0226
[0.0280] [0.0672]
OSS   FirmSize :> 1000 -0.0211 -0.0365
[0.0158] [0.0326]
OSS   FirmSize :<= 10 0.0439 0.0524
[0.0369] [0.0730]
OSS   FirmSize : FirmSize : 100   1000 0.0051 0.0096
[0.0161] [0.0253]
OSS   FirmSize : FirmSize : FirmSize : 11   100 -0.0136 -0.0173
[0.0150] [0.0288]
Age 0.0436 0.0439 0.0438 0.0451 0.0437 0.0438
[0.0071]*** [0.0057]*** [0.0064]*** [0.0053]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0060]***
Age2 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
Tenure 0.0111 0.0115 0.0113 0.0115 0.0115 0.0114
[0.0027]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0030]***
Tenure2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.0001]** [0.0001]** [0.0001]** [0.0001]** [0.0001]** [0.0001]**
IT Work Experience 0.0323 0.0323 0.0324 0.0322 0.0323 0.0324
[0.0027]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0024]***
IT Work Experience2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]***
Gender 0.0633 0.0637 0.0631 0.0628 0.0636 0.0633
[0.0228]*** [0.0224]*** [0.0213]*** [0.0219]*** [0.0284]** [0.0247]**
EDU: Uni 0.1833 0.1928 0.1832 0.1839 0.1865 0.1836
[0.0178]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0149]*** [0.0168]*** [0.0141]*** [0.0147]***
EDU: Polytechnical 0.1273 0.1385 0.127 0.1278 0.1326 0.1272
[0.0183]*** [0.0174]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0160]*** [0.0151]*** [0.0145]***
EDU: Advanced Vocational 0.0368 0.0501 0.0362 0.0367 0.0414 0.0362
[0.0207]* [0.0196]** [0.0175]** [0.0211]* [0.0180]** [0.0158]**
EDU: Vocational -0.0514 -0.0428 -0.0525 -0.0511 -0.0481 -0.0521
[0.0173]*** [0.0159]*** [0.0135]*** [0.0175]*** [0.0137]*** [0.0143]***
EDU: Uni No Degree 0.0381 0.051 0.038 0.0382 0.0402 0.0376
[0.0196]* [0.0171]*** [0.0160]** [0.0192]** [0.0182]** [0.0206]*
Supervisor 0.0866 0.0867 0.0867 0.0859 0.0867 0.0864
[0.0072]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0073]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0065]***
Urban Area 0.0621 0.0631 0.063 0.0626 0.0633 0.0631
[0.0082]*** [0.0071]*** [0.0073]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0087]*** [0.0080]***
Firm Size: > 1000 0.2423 0.2418 0.2546 0.2415 0.2415 0.246
[0.0158]*** [0.0162]*** [0.0172]*** [0.0135]*** [0.0163]*** [0.0155]***
Firm Size: 100   1000 0.1605 0.1603 0.1688 0.16 0.1601 0.163
[0.0183]*** [0.0147]*** [0.0171]*** [0.0134]*** [0.0161]*** [0.0153]***
Firm Size: 11   100 0.0921 0.0923 0.1044 0.0924 0.0923 0.0962
[0.0160]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0169]*** [0.0145]*** [0.0156]*** [0.0167]***
Foreign Work Experience 0.0841 0.0841 0.0842 0.0847 0.0839 0.0838
[0.0080]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0079]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0095]***
Year 2007 -0.0272 -0.0277 -0.0273 -0.0276 -0.0274 -0.0274
[0.0061]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0067]*** [0.0073]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0071]***
Constant 6.5074 6.5034 6.5032 6.4858 6.5118 6.5093
[0.1224]*** [0.1133]*** [0.1211]*** [0.1014]*** [0.1259]*** [0.1114]***
Observations 7115 7115 7115 7115 7115 7115
adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
Employment Field Dummies Chi2 606.96 601.70 275.89 756.39 739.95 858.38
Federal State Dummies Chi2 519.12 982.00 780.45 538.47 533.37 1231.11
Industry Dummies Chi2 356.18 177.32 334.42 252.58 270.81 464.80
Remarks: Dependent variable is log W. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.*,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% error
probability. Default categories: EDU: No Degree; Firm Size:1   10
26Table 6: Regression for Programmer and Software Developer Subsample
OSS 0.0004
[0.0179]
OSS   EDU : University -0.0203
[0.0221]
OSS   EDU : Polytechnical 0.001
[0.0206]
OSS   EDU : Advanced V ocational 0.0013
[0.0430]
OSS   EDU : V ocational -0.0366
[0.0317]
OSS   EDU : Uni without Degree -0.0219
[0.0391]










IT Work Experience 0.0285 0.0296
[0.0047]*** [0.0045]***




EDU: University 0.1744 0.2043
[0.0367]*** [0.0361]***
EDU: Polytechnical 0.1222 0.1535
[0.0377]*** [0.0384]***
EDU: Advanced Vocational 0.0336 0.0622
[0.0405] [0.0391]
EDU: Vocational -0.0853 -0.0416
[0.0396]** [0.0381]




Urban Area 0.0729 0.0714
[0.0121]*** [0.0106]***
Firm Size: > 1000 0.2432 0.2309
[0.0229]*** [0.0202]***
Firm Size: 100   1000 0.1613 0.1556
[0.0229]*** [0.0192]***
Firm Size: 11   100 0.082 0.0803
[0.0194]*** [0.0177]***
Foreign Work Experience 0.0574 0.0585
[0.0121]*** [0.0128]***






Federal State Dummies Chi2 369.87 333.55
Industry Dummies Chi2 62.74 72.84
Exogeneity Tests for OSS
Excluded Instruments: Knowledge Linux OS, Mac OS
Predictive power F(2, 2499) = 51.44
(“ﬁrst stage”) p =0 .00
Kleibergen-Paap Chi2 = 98.51
Underidentiﬁkation LM Test p =0 .00
Hansen J statistic for Chi2 =0 .29
orthogonality of instruments p =0 .492
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2 =0 .003
Exogeneity Test p =0 .954
Remarks: Dependent variable is log W. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. *,**,*** indicate signif-
icance at 10%, 5%, 1% error probability. Default categories: EDU: No Degree; Firm Size:1   10
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